CHAPTER 03 35 MIN READ INTERMEDIATE

Windows Artifact Forensics: Registry, Execution Evidence & Filesystem Metadata

A Windows system keeps writing evidence of what it did long after the disk image from Chapter 2 is acquired. Execution history, folder browsing, and file access get scattered across the registry, the filesystem, and the event logs. This chapter walks the highest-value artifact types and how to read them.

registry forensicsexecution artifactsfilesystem metadataevent log forensics

The Registry as Evidence

The Windows registry is not just configuration storage. Its hives hold a running record of accounts, services, installed software, and per-user activity that survives well past the session that created it.

HiveForensic Value
SAMLocal user accounts on the machine
SYSTEMServices, devices, and computer configuration
SOFTWAREInstalled applications, some execution evidence
NTUSER.DATPer-user settings and activity, loaded from each user's profile
UsrClass.datPer-user shell and COM activity, shellbags live here
Note: Two per-user registry keys come up constantly in execution-evidence work, both under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer in NTUSER.DAT: UserAssist, which records GUI program launches along with a run count, with the value names ROT-13 encoded, and RunMRU, which records commands typed into the Run dialog in most-recently-used order.

Execution and Usage Evidence

Beyond the registry, Windows leaves a second layer of usage evidence in dedicated system files. Each artifact type proves a slightly different claim about what happened on the machine.

ArtifactWhat It Proves
PrefetchA program was executed, and roughly how many times and when it last ran
ShellbagsA folder was browsed in Explorer, even if it was later deleted
Jump Lists / LNK filesA specific file was opened, often including the original file path even after the file moves
Recent DocumentsA file was recently accessed by the user
Note: These artifacts are strongest in combination. Prefetch alone tells you a program ran; a matching LNK file or Jump List entry can tell you which file it opened when it did.

Filesystem Metadata

Every file on an NTFS volume carries timestamps, commonly summarized as MACB: Modified, Accessed, Changed (metadata change), and Born (created). Reading these correctly is central to placing activity in time.

  • Modified: file content was last written
  • Accessed: file was last opened or read
  • Changed: file metadata (permissions, name, attributes) was last altered
  • Born: file was originally created

NTFS actually keeps two separate sets of these timestamps: one in $STANDARD_INFORMATION and one in $FILE_NAME. Most tools show you the first set by default, but the second exists too, and the gap between them matters for spotting tampering, a topic Chapter 5 covers in full.

Note: The USN Journal is a separate change log NTFS maintains for volume activity. It can show that a file was created, renamed, or deleted even after the file itself is gone from disk.

Event Log Forensics

Windows event logs are stored in the EVTX format and record system, security, and application activity as discrete numbered events. A handful of Event IDs carry outsized forensic value.

Event IDWhat It Represents
4624 / 4625A successful or failed logon
4688A new process was created
4720A new user account was created
Note: This module doesn't re-teach the full Windows Event ID catalog. For the complete reference, including AD attack detection events like DCSync and RBCD, see the Windows module.

Correlating Artifacts Into a Story

No single artifact stands on its own as proof. A defensible finding comes from lining several artifact types up against the same event and checking that they agree.

1
Registry
UserAssist or RunMRU shows intent to launch something
→
2
Prefetch
Confirms the program actually executed, and roughly when
→
3
Filesystem Metadata
$MFT timestamps place the file in time
→
4
Event Log
Event ID 4688 ties execution to a specific logon session and user

No single artifact here is proof by itself. Correlation across artifact types is what turns a set of clues into a defensible finding.

Key Takeaways

  • Registry hives each hold a different slice of evidence: SAM for accounts, SYSTEM for configuration, SOFTWARE for installed apps, NTUSER.DAT and UsrClass.dat for per-user activity.
  • UserAssist and RunMRU are well-documented registry keys that record GUI launches and typed commands.
  • Execution and usage artifacts like Prefetch, Shellbags, Jump Lists, LNK files, and Recent Documents each prove a distinct claim about what the user did.
  • NTFS timestamps are commonly summarized as MACB, and the filesystem keeps two separate copies, in $STANDARD_INFORMATION and $FILE_NAME, which matters for detecting tampering.
  • The USN Journal can show filesystem activity even after the files involved are gone.
  • EVTX event logs, especially IDs like 4624/4625, 4688, and 4720, anchor artifacts to specific logon sessions and users.
  • No artifact type is conclusive alone. Correlating registry, execution, filesystem, and event log evidence together is what builds a defensible narrative.

Knowledge Check

Click an answer to reveal the explanation.

Shellbags are most useful for proving which of the following?

Correct answer: B. Shellbags record folder-browsing activity in Explorer and persist even after the folder itself is deleted, which makes them valuable for reconstructing what a user looked at.

What does the presence of a Prefetch file for an executable most directly indicate?

Correct answer: C. Prefetch files are created when a program runs, and they track run count and last-run timing, which makes them strong evidence of execution.

Why does it matter that NTFS keeps timestamps in both $STANDARD_INFORMATION and $FILE_NAME?

Correct answer: C. Most tools only surface $STANDARD_INFORMATION timestamps, which are the ones commonly altered by timestomping tools. Comparing them against $FILE_NAME can reveal tampering, covered in full in Chapter 5.